This article argues that the conventional conceptualization in political science of politics is problematic, that it is overly narrow and constrained. This is because it excludes a range of actions like satire and humour which have come to play an increasing role in inspiring and provoking powerful political emotions and in informing the political agenda. Drawing on the work of critical scholars, it is argued that emotion, ethics and art can be deeply political. Moreover, new forms of media have encouraged newold forms of political action often at the hands of young people who hitherto have been marginalized from the public sphere. Digital technology enables the production of user-generated content, opening new spaces for information, the exchange of ideas and mobilization. This article highlights the work of the young German satirist Jan Böhmermann to demonstrate how expressive art is playing a major role in shaping public opinion, in contesting power elites and informing political debate. In short, I use Böhmermann's 2015 satire depicting Greco-German relations in the midst of a financial crisis and fears of loan defaults to argue for a broader understanding of politics that is inclusive of activities conventionally deemed non-rational.
There have been a number of significant political responses. Significant numbers of people in countries experiencing the most severe austerity measures reacted angrily. Millions of Europeans took to the streets, occupying city squares and other open spaces as part of anti-austerity protests that erupted across Europe (e.g., Pontusson & Raess, 2012; Rüdig & Karyotis, 2013) . As research indicates, some of this protest deployed new information technologies to inform, communicate and mobilize widespread protest action (Giugni & Grasso, 2015; Psimitis, 2011; Sloam, 2014, pp. 217-231) . This popular response was elicited and invigorated courtesy of new media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook) through networks of dispersed groups that worked to coalesce activism. That energy also began to favour the growth of anti-establishment political parties like Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece and the Five Star Movement in Italy (Moschonas, 2013 ). Yet, not all political scientists have seen these forms of 'new politics' as 'political'.
Political science and the politics of austerity
A significant body of work has been produced since [2008] [2009] which claims that 'real politics' has nothing to do with what writers like Srnicek and Williams dismiss as 'folk politics' of the kind represented 'by Occupy, Spain's 15M, student occupations … Tiqqun and the Invisible Committee … the Zapatistas and contemporary anarchist-tinged politics ' (2015, p. 11) . I refer, for example, to the following work of scholars (Bessant, 2014; Calhoun, 2013, pp. 26-38; Giugni & Grasso, 2015; Kaldor & Selchow, 2013, pp. 78-99; Loader & Mercea, 2012; Manning 2015; Vromen, Loader, & Xenos, 2015, pp. 532-549 ). Yet, those who rely on conventional accounts of politics and on accounts like those articulated by Snricek and Williams (2015) , local, spontaneous, ethical and emotional 'responses' to oppression, are not political. They are not political because 'real' politics will require 'counter hegemonic thinking', that is, structural analysis and the building of new institutions (Snricek & Williams, 2015) .
It is this kind of response that justifies the writing of this article. Much of the attention given to the politics of anti-austerity especially by mainstream political scientists has been framed by certain long-dominant conceptual and methodological preoccupations that have helped to shape the evolution of Western political science as a discipline. Central to this evolution has been a reliance on what Leftwich referred to when he wrote that 'the way one defines politics will significantly influence what one looks for and how one analyses politics, that is the methodology of inquiry ' (2002, p. 5) .
While there is no single 'operational definition of politics' or constructive scheme in modern political science, there are certainly a number of leading traditions and approaches. Leftwich points to the dominance of an 'institutionalist' approach which suggests that 'politics' is only found in certain societies possessing certain institutions like governments, Parliaments and so forth (2004; see also Heywood, 2013, p. 17) . Until the 1950s, the study of politics primarily involved the study of institutions. It was a 'tradition of institutionalism' that focused on the rules, procedures and formal organization of government, and employed methods akin to those used in the study of law and history (Heywood, 2013) . Running in conjunction with that tradition was a 'behaviourist' tradition that tended to privilege quantitative methods and which was committed to scientism. This sustained the proliferation of studies of issues like voting behaviour, the behaviour of legislators and lobbyists, all deploying quantitative research methods.
From the 1980s, a 'new institutionalism' emerged. While remaining faithful to the core institutionalist premise that 'institutions mattered' (because political structures shape political behaviour), 'new institutionalism' revised an understanding of what constitutes an 'institution' in a number of ways. Political institutions were no longer equated with political organizations which were seen instead as sets of 'rules', which guide or constrain the behaviour of individual actors. Those rules, moreover, were as likely to be informal as formal policy-making processes sometimes shaped by unwritten conventions or understandings than by formal arrangements.
Implicit assumptions about what is 'political' operate in each of these 'traditions'. A key assumption is the idea that for any action to be 'political', there need to be motivations capable of being expressed in political language, that is, of being rationally articulated and of being expressed through legitimate, institutional means. As Akram observes, the focus on rationality is telling because it points to the ways a discipline like political science only legitimates certain forms of activity as 'political' by relying on tacit premises like the idea that 'rationality' is coterminous with conventional forms of strategic political action.
The effect of these constitutive assumptions is evident in a symptomatic treatment of the politics of anti-austerity protest (Kriesi, 2014) . Kriesi is interested in 'the question of how political parties influence the mobilization by social movements ' (2014, p. 1) . This is why he argues that:
… electoral choices and protest, mobilization by political parties and social movements are part and parcel of one and the same process of political interest intermediation that continuously links the different forms of interest articulation, in the various channels and arenas of the political system. (2014, p. 2) This work is consonant with the dominant conceptualization of politics as a form of 'rational action' which has a powerful narrowing effect. It can be suggested that the effort to understand human action in this way relies too heavily on a rational and cognitivist bias which has the effect of overlooking the role of emotions in politics (Barbalet 1998) . This is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the idea of political action as rational, instrumental or goal-oriented action or as value rational action overlooks the highly creative or constitutive role of participants as they 'discover' or constitute political or policy 'problems'. Secondly, it is a framing that encourages us to ignore the contingency of politics and its disorderly, variable and unexpected qualities including the role of confusion, misguided conduct, accidents, deliberate deception, ignorance and malevolence. Finally, the insistence on the requirement of rationality ignores the role a variety of 'non-rational' attributes and activities can play in the enhancement of democratic politics.
In this article, I explore the idea that among the political elements we see in the antiausterity politics after 2008-2009 are laughter, ridicule and satire. While the role of humour in politics has been acknowledged in political science (Baym & Jones, 2012; Day, 2011; Holbert, 2013, pp. 305-323) , that recognition has been grudging and minimal at best. This article adumbrates the point made by Critchley when he argued that movements like the indignados movement in Spain and Greece or Britain's 'UK Uncut' were responding to 'situational injustice' and relied on releasing an 'ethical energy' that flowed in new ways (2007) . It is an idea that has also been explored in his account of the way laughter and ridicule brought about significant moral revulsion and political change (see also Appiah, 2010, pp. 3-17) .
Against the constrained notion of politics found in conventional political science, I suggest here that satire, humour, poetics and parody have played an important role in Europe's anti-austerity politics. It is a development that owes much to new media as a technology for producing user-generated satire and communicating it through YouTube (Dias da Silva & Garcia, 2012, pp. 89-114) . In this way, moral emotions and aesthetics are playing a more popular and persuasive role in political communication.
How digital media augments politics
As this article demonstrates, digital communication technology can be used in ways that bypass or make redundant more conventional forms of political communication such as press reporting, TV news or radio documentaries. It can be used to build new and expand existing network cultures in ways that were hitherto not possible for 'ordinary citizens'. Traditionally, the combination of technology and the corporate media business model meant that a relatively clear separation existed between the 'creators' and technicians employed in the industry to use the communications technology owned and operated by the company and the 'audience' who consumed the media content. Digital media has helped significantly to dissolve the distinction between producers and consumers by virtue of the fact that new technologies enable and encourage user-generated content. In conjunction with the open-networked nature of the technology, this means that more people can produce more content and get it out to larger audiences without relying on in-house industrial and technical logistics owned by traditional media companies. In short, the new technologies facilitate low-cost communication with specifically targeted and global audiences.
The technologies enable people to access low-cost production technologies and the technical affordances built into those technologies enable high-quality production values. It also allows users to produce a wider variety of content.
Another feature is that audiences themselves can become part of the creative and communication processes. This becomes clear, for example, when a political action 'goes viral' as the content is replicated by the audience, it may be added to and spread to others who, in turn, do the same. Thus, messages are disseminated through the active involvement of audience members' use of social media (Twitter, links, Facebook, likes, etc … ). This in turn creates a rhizome, in that it works to increase participation within democratic processes. It also has the effect of destabilizing conventional mainstream, media and established institutional arrangements.
The result is a communication medium that is more difficult for gate-keepers and others traditionally employed by large-scale media companies to manage debates, to edit and to generally control what goes out into the public sphere.
New technologies enable 'ordinary people' to reframe events and ideas in ways that question implicit beliefs, meanings and values and to communicate those alternative schemata inviting audiences to become participants, to rethink how they ordinarily interpret events and to mobilize to action. In these ways, it informs public opinion, it opens up new spaces and challenges established older spaces, it enables deliberation and thus augments our public spheres.
Digital media offers forms of direct action and bottom-up politics that constrains and counters the hitherto near domination of traditional power elites (politicians, etc.) over messages. Importantly, it highlights the ways non-rational actions like art, humour, ridicule and silliness, that do not fit the conventional category of politics as rational action, work to enliven critical debates and ways of seeing the world. Because it facilitates a rich repertoire of political action some of which clearly does not fit within the category of 'political', it directly challenged the idea of politics and policy-making as rational action.
Drawing on the work of critical theorists, a case is made here that actions informed by 'qualities' long considered 'irrational' played a critical role in the anti-austerity politics (Appiah, 2010; Critchley, 2007; Manning, 2012, pp. 1-17; Mizen, 2015, pp. 167-182; Mouffe, 2005a Mouffe, , 2005b Ranciere, 2010) . The article contributes to a growing literature on user-generated satire (Dias da Silva & Garcia, 2012, pp. 89-114; Jonnum, 2013) to highlight ways digital media is used to augment the public sphere not simply by enlarging debate but also by encouraging the inclusion of a group hitherto largely excluded from the public sphere. I note also that it is typically young people who are using new media to create and communicate this old art form in new ways. This article aims to demonstrate how one old form of art, namely, satire, is being revived courtesy of new media in ways that provide a powerful medium for political engagement on the part of youthful activists.
I offer a case study involving a young German comedian Jan Böhmermann who aired his 'Greco-German one-finger salute' on 25 February 2015 followed by an 'apology' on 28 February 2015. These comedic interventions generated passionate debate in Germany, intensified already sensitive international relations between Greece and Germany, and prompted heated exchanges between German and Greek officials.
Böhmermann's work provides a bounded case that demonstrates the political nature of satire. It demonstrates how new media provides opportunities for a more inclusive and enriched public sphere. The key protagonist Böhmermann, thirty-four at the time of making the satires, helps to illustrate how certain groups -namely, young people -previously marginalized or excluded from the public sphere, now have access to political forums courtesy of new technology.
I begin with a review of some dominant or conventional ways of representing and politics in political science and political theory.
Political science and satire
As mentioned, mainstream political science privileges electoral politics, political behaviour, citizenship education, constitutional, parliamentary and government studies (e.g., Leigh, 2010; Mahler, Jesuit, & Paradowski, 2014, pp. 361-373; Martin, 2012) . Methodologically, mainstream political science relies on empirical and positivist research methods that encourage those with behaviourist inclinations to assume that as autonomous, selfinterested individuals, we act in rational ways to maximize our utility. Conventional political scientists also rely on analysis and/or measurement of a relatively narrow range of political practices (e.g., voting, party membership, volunteering, civic engagement) (e.g., Bauerlein, 2009; Kimberlee, 2002; Print, Saha, & Edwards, 2004) . A parallel disposition to privilege certain styles of rationality is evident when political science engages in political theory evident in the use of various formal logical criteria and formal discursive exposition (Williams, 2002) . This can be seen in the way the liberal political tradition has been defended by formidably well-equipped theorists like Rawls (1971) and Habermas (1984 Habermas ( , 1996 . This tradition articulates conventional rules of engagement, values and consensus over dissensus, and privileges a style of Kantian rational deliberation (Habermas, 1984 (Habermas, , 1996 . Habermas articulated a discursively grounded communication theory oriented to value rationality (Habermas, 1984 (Habermas, , 1996 . Many writers have subsequently elaborated Habermas' work (Barber, 1984; Benhabib, 1996; Bohmann, 1996; Dryze, 1990 Dryze, , 2000 Elster, 1998; Olson, 2006) . All this gave further credence to a formalistic approach to political discourse and practice.
Practices that do not accord with the ethos set out in this approach tend not to be considered political. Meanwhile, others argue that democratic politics was never shaped by norms of rationality or public opinion formed by rational debate and consensus to the extent set out in Habermasian conceptions of the bourgeois public sphere (Kellner, 1999) . Some take this critique further pointing to the ways user-generated satire contributes to and enriches the public sphere (Baym & Jones, 2012; Day, 2011; Holbert, 2013, pp. 305-323) .
Outside the disciplinary boundaries of political science, others have better understood the actual diversity and disorderliness of political activity. Historians have long understood, for example, the central role of humour and especially satire in politics. The American historian Robert Darnton documented the political role of satire in pre-revolutionary France showing how satirists like Rabelais, Beaumarchais, Chamfort and Voltaire directed their ridicule and wit against 'the powerful' in ways that prepared the way for the 1793 French revolution. Equally valuably, these historians demonstrated the role of satire in energizing the rise of the 'public sphere' (Darnton, 1982 (Darnton, , 1996 Dorra, 1994) . More recently, writers like Ranciere (2010) and (Critchley, 2007) have provided an account of politics that challenges conventional conceptions by emphasizing the role of humour.
In what follows, I draw on a case study to highlight how conventional conceptions of politics can be augmented by being inclusive of artistic practice. I suggest that courtesy of digital media, the works of satirists like Jan Böhmermann provide insight into the kinds of user-generated comedic political expressivity now populating the public sphere.
Case study
On 25 February 2015, in a context marked by intense European interest in 'Greek debt' and the possibility of default, the German comedian Jan Böhmermann produced a satirical video which he aired on youth station 'ZDF Neo Magazine Royale' (https://www.youtube. com/watch?v = Afl9WFGJE0M). It 'went to air' soon after the 'left-wing' Greek government led by Alex Tsipras won office while promising to renegotiate Greece's debt to international creditors.
By then, Germany's mainstream media had developed what some described as a 'love affair' with Greece's new Minister of Finance, Yanis Varoufakis. Represented as a maverick economist with Greece's fate in his hands, Varoufakis was a portrayed as a 'cool strongman' who preferred a black leather jacket to a suit and rode a motor bike. He was a 'radical punk' 'threatening' the European community (Littger cited Wagstyl, 2015) . According to German reporter Sauerbrey, German media 'marvelled' even as they 'despised' his unconventional approach: 'He has what none of our representatives have … Mr. Varoufakis is the glamorous rebel challenging the establishment of austerity politics' (Sauerbrey, 2015) .
His youthful vitality and hip-style were highlighted in contrast to his elderly, staid and conservative German counterpart Wolfgang Schäuble, from a part of Germany 'best known … for its singsong dialect and reputation for tidiness' (Sauerbrey, 2015) .
Böhmermann's Greco-German one-finger salute Böhmermann's satire poked fun at German nationalism and 'German supremacy' offset by Germany's feeling of 'complete helplessness' in the face of the 'cool' and sophisticated Varoufakis. The satire opens with soft music and a gentle voice-over: 'We are Germans! We are honest, trustworthy people. We are hard as steel, tough as leather and fast as hounds'. A number of typecast Germanic characters enter the scene: one man in a Weimar army uniform, another in a Nazi uniform, a girl in traditional Dirndl Bavarian dress, and an Alsatian dog. They sing in chorus about 'Germanic virtues' like punctuality and fearlessness: 'We are always on time. We are afraid of nothing' (Figure 1) .
Film shots of unappetizing 'famous national dishes' like stuffed pig stomach, blood sausage and roast horse are used to poke fun at German cuisine. The German language is next in the firing line. Germans 'are known around the world for their beautifully melodic yet easy to learn language and for our famous sense of humour'. A beautiful young Aryan teacher-mistress in traditional dress pulls out her cane, using it to hit her own hand in a humorous, disciplinarian, dominatrix manner. At the same time, she points to the impossibly difficult words on chalked on classroom blackboard with the clear expectation you pay attention and recite them -or else.
Varoufakis's name enters the soundtrack through a chorus singing: 'We are Germans'. Images of Varoufakis are contrasted with photos of siblings with a soundtrack suggestive of incest:
'Yes, some of us actually do have sex with our closest relatives. It's an ancient German tradition mainly practiced in a region called Saarland. … We are Germans'. The soundtrack continues with a savage critique of Germany:
Our Gross Domestic Product sums up to 3.7 trillion US Dollars which makes us the fourth largest economy in the world by far leading in Europe. Our gold reserves are the second largest in the world. Please don't ask where it came from. We are Germans. We started two world wars and almost won them both. Almost. We don't fear death. But from off in the distance there comes a man.
The film's tempo turns upbeat as heroic a Varoufakis look-alike floods on to the screen, riding a speeding motor bike accompanied by the voice cover:
Crazed, seeking vengeance against our peaceful land. Jacket collar raised, on a black motorbike. He puts the hell in Hellenic and wants to take our pride Yanis Varoufakis Greek Minister of Awesome. Relentless Varoufakis.
Then comes rock music with more images of Varoufakis 'the strong and cool man' as the narrative continues:
He's the lost son of Zeus with a heart made of stone Go, take all of our savings but, please, leave us alone! His looks burn like fire, his body screams of sex. Our Minister of Finance doesn't even have legs His leather jacket is made of skin from German shepherd puppies. He feasts on human babies. Even his wife is smoking hot, like a playmate from the Eighties.
Böhmermann then 'warns' the audience: Varoufakis 'doesn't take prisoners':
He doesn't negotiate, he simply kicks ass. He wants us on our knees. And we cannot resist him … Help … because he is so totally … 100% … At the end of the video, older footage of Varoufakis is used -taken from a 2013 Croatian conference before he became Greek's Finance Minister (Figure 2) .
In this extract, Varoufakis appears to make a metaphoric 'one-finger gesture' as he announces that Greece should default on its loans, like Argentina did, to force creditors to acknowledge that Greece is bankrupt rather than forcing it to pay unmanageable loans. Germany 'can now solve this problem by yourself' and Greece should '… stick the finger to Germany and say well you can now solve this problem by yourself, right'. At that point, Varoufakis appears to give 'the finger to Germany'.
Political reactions
The satire worked as a lightning rod for German populist anger over the question of Greek debt repayment (Mackey, 2015) . It threw Germany into an uproar.
Soon after the satire was aired, Varoufakis appeared on a popular state-owned prime time German TV show: 'ARD' on Bild-Zeitung news station. The famous TV host Jauch Gunther showed his guest, Varoufakis, an excerpt from Böhmermann's satire. It depicted Varoufakis at the 2013 Croatian conference where he appeared to 'give Germany the finger'. Varoufakis denied he made the gesture, saying that the film was doctored. Jauch rejected that claim. To support his accusation that Varoufakis was lying, Jauch called on experts to testify the film's authenticity. He then aired that expert opinion.
Jauch went on to chastise Varoufakis for his attitude towards the debt crisis and threat to default. He accused Varoufakis of being dishonest, and described him as 'unconventional', a German euphemism for 'pretty crazy'. According to German journalist Sauerbrey, that was precisely what so many Germans marvelled at and despised him (2015) . While Varoufakis denied making the gesture, he did not deny suggesting that Greece default on the loans and that Germany can fix them problem themselves.
In response, many German media workers joined the fray as Bild-Zeitung news led the pack.
Adding fuel to the fire, on 19 March 2015, the camera man who recorded the original 2013 Croatian speech (Martin Beros) contradicted Varoufakis's claim that he did not give Germany 'the one-finger salute'. According to Beros, the Greece's Finance Minister Varoufakis did in fact make the gesture. Beros also used the opportunity to air his own views that Varoufakis was well justified in defaulting on the loan (Mackey, 2015) . According to Beros' 'testimony', the film was authentic. That 'admission' was then played repeatedly on German airways.
On 17 March 2015, Varoufakis responded on twitter providing a link to a video of the 2013 speech in its entirety. He explained that by 'doctored' he meant that the clip had been edited out of its original context'. Here, he said it is the 'undoctored video' (Varoufakis, 2015) .
Böhmermann's 'confession'
Three days after airing the first satire, Böhmermann produced a second satire, a tongue-incheek 'confession' in which he admitted to having taken Varoufakis's 'gesture' out of context (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = Vx-1LQu6mAE&feature = youtu.be). In that video, he said that he had waited days for someone to ask him if he faked the footage, but no one had.
Böhmermann used his confession to poke more fun at German mainstream media and politicians. Particular attention was given to responses from powerful media pundits like Günther Jauch and his reliance on 'experts' to authenticate the footage (Figure 3) .
Böhmermann went on to ridicule Jauch: 'Dear Günther Jauch … you must now all be very strong.' He called on Jauch and the Bild-Zeitung newspaper to 'pack up shop'.
He explained that he created the 'Greco-German salute' satire to expose Germany's 'ridiculous reactions' to feelings of being 'slighted' by Greece.
Devastating Europe two times within a century, but going nuts when somebody's giving us the finger … Objective debate is utterly out of the question. When a Greek gives us the finger, we totally freak out because we are Germans. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = Vx1LQu6mAE&feature = youtu.be)
Böhmermann then offered an apology: 'Sorry, Mr Varoufakis, we won't do it again' as he confessed that the video had been digitally altered.
On the question of Varoufakis suggesting that Greece might default on its loans, Böh-mermann maintained that this had not been falsified. Rather he said, Varoufakis's comments were taken 'out of context … so that average Germans could pursue their passion for being angered' (Böhmermann cited in Mackey, 2015) . In spite of the 'admission', popular outrage and righteous anger continued filling the airways.
Soon after Böhmermann's 'confession', Varoufakis went public affirming the value of satire and Böhmermann's work. He tweeted:
… @janboehm Humour, satire & self deprecation are great solvents of blind nationalism. We politicians need you badly. (Varoufakis @yanisvaroufakis) Varoufakis also posted a link to Böhmermann's confession along with a question to TV 'anchor man' Jauch asking if Jauch planned to apologize for calling him a liar: Böhmermann's confession restored a degree of normality, 'Germany wiped the sweat off its brow and went back to TV as usual, to cooking and hospital serials' (Sauerbrey, 2015) .
The 'one-finger salute' satire worked to inflame German righteous rage. A series of 'moral panics' ensued, as 'right-thinking people' 'manned the moral brigades'. Böhmermann's satire made a powerful political intervention in the ways it focused on the issues of justice and debt. It excited populist German anger and exacerbated the already acrimonious relations between Germany and Greece, and other European countries (Sauerbrey, 2015) .
Interpretative frame
Böhmermann's 'one-finger salute' and his 'apology' used exaggerated national stereotypes of Germans as 'rational', 'efficient', 'disciplined' and 'serious' fully prepared to take the opportunity to be offended at the idea that their nation could be given 'the one-finger salute'. By mocking German officialdom, and certain 'sacred' symbols of national pride and history, Böhmermann invited Germans to reflect on their history, certain of their prejudices and their actions. The ridiculing of German stereotypes was intended to embarrass and illuminate some important dimensions of Germany's collective identity. This entailed references to the risible like traditional offal-based 'German cuisine' (stuffed pig stomach, blood sausage and roast horse) and to far weightier issues like the sensitive matter of Germany's military history and the role played by its 'sense of national superiority', especially in the 1930s and 1940s.
Böhmermann used laughter to describe what Aristotle called the 'specifies of what is disgraceful'. They evoke political emotions (righteous anger, fear, enthusiasm) that affect the mind and that exist in us all (Aristotle cited in Heath 1996). The deeply political nature of Böhmermann's satire was evident in the ways it revealed the political emotions, namely German patriotism and feeling of superiority. He was highly effective in using satire and new media to evoke feelings of humiliation and pride (wounded pride) by pointing to the ways Greeks, 'threatened' to be particularly 'offensive' and 'unfair' by reneging on their loans and leaving creditors (Germany) to 'carry the can'. He highlighted the effect of satire on those prone to strong feelings of shame, guilt, anger, hurt pride and indeed hysteria, evident in how certain people acted out in response to the provocations in ways that affirmed both satirist's points.
In terms spelt out by Bakhtin (1984) , Böhmermann invoked the carnivalesque and its inversion of normal hierarchies. Böhmermann's satires provided comic relief from the grind of daily life; they offered glimpses into alternative political and social relations and opportunities to question the established order. He used humour to override and suspend hierarchical rankings, to challenge certain privileges of power and to question norms about what can and cannot be said and done. As such, his satire was a 'comedic roasting', a 'feast of becoming', and of enacting change (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 10) .
In typically carnivalesque style, Böhmermann created fissures between the ways things seemed to various spectators and 'how they should be'. These fissures went to the gaps Böhmermann opened up between expectations about 'proper' diplomatic international relations requiring political leaders to express respectful pieties about other leaders and nations and Varoufakis's 'eccentric' behaviour up to the point where he appeared to 'give Germany the finger' and worse, his preparedness to think about defaulting on loans that he considered unfair. In these ways, Böhmermann's satire, like many other art forms do, raised issues for debate that were otherwise beyond what was considered speakable within the domain of rational deliberative practice.
Disjunctures were also drawn out through comparisons made within the satire between Germany's grey, staid and serious politicians and 'media experts' and 'the Greek god'-cum-hero warrior Varoufakis, with his unconventional manner, shaved head and sculptured 'manly physique'. In a teasing fashion, Varoufakis was portrayed as everything 'Germans really desired' but could not have. It was an effective technique made so by the use of exaggerated caricatures which worked by putting into the minds of audience important political issues, to allow them to see 'things' differently from the ways they are conventionally understood and to even consider otherwise taboo ideas and imagery. This included the possibility that some Germans might harbour a subliminal sexual desire for Varoufakis, a yearning for the authority of the strong man leader he was said to have represented. Such caricatures worked as persuasive techniques, by encouraging people to think and by soliciting powerful moral emotions, and in this case, they were so effected, touched and resonated with certain deep-seated enmities, national psyche and history.
In effect, Böhmermann's satire worked to symbolically invert the 'asymmetric' power relations between Greece and Germany. In portraying Germans as secretly desirous of the tall 'heavy-duty leader' Varoufakis all kitted out in his black leather jacket, Böhmer-mann reiterated the image of Varoufakis as fearless and youthful and in doing so communicated the ideas that power relations between the two countries may not be as they seemed. It is a technique that celebrated 'the Greek nemesis', the figure paradoxically said to be 'inferior' the financial leader of a faltering economy populated with a supposed weak moral disposition and in need of critique because he was prepared to default on loans. To do this Bohmermann celebrated Varoufakis as the Greek nemesis, a figure conventionally represented in Germany as the feckless and morally compromised financial leader of a bankrupt economy prepared to default on Greek debt. To make his point to a German audience Bohmermann emphasised the conventional stereotypes of Greeks as lazy, unpunctual and unreliable, yet led by Varoufakis a man they envied. It was a satire that celebrated Germanys political nemesis, the Marxist progressive who was courageous enough to say what he thought.
For some, the carnival spirit in such satire also provided cathartic release through sidesplitting laughter. For others, it incites quite extreme and sometimes violent responses which provide further material for satirists. This was the case for Böhmermann. His 'Greco-German salute' provoked populists rage and excessive reactions which were highly emotional and deviated from the 'ethical ideal' of relative moderation. They were the extreme, even hysteric responses that provided Böhmermann with material for his follow-up 'confessional' satire and the lampooning of key protagonists. Those 'over-thetop' reactions allowed Böhmermann to ask what they revealed about the prospect of 'objective' rational debate. They also prompted politicians like Varoufakis to re-enter the fray, suggesting that : @janboehm Humour, satire & self-deprecation are great solvents of blind nationalism. We politicians need you badly. (@yanisvaroufakis 19 March 2015) Böhmermann aroused political emotions like patriotism, outrage and indignation about 'the very idea' southern European 'layabouts' could get away with an 'ethically dubious' act of 'reneging on loans'. And from the Greek perspective, it worked to rekindle historic and not too repressed resentment about the Second World War reparations and German imperialism. In this case, humour functioned to energize, to incite outrage, a sense of righteous anger and injustice. 'The very idea' that the Greek government should borrow money and then refuse to repay was unfair. Yet, for many Greeks, it was equally outrageous that their 'financially destitute' nation should suffer further because it was beholden to 'the Troika' (European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) due to 'bailouts' in return for agreeing to austerity policies (increased tax cuts to public spending, etc.). The austere terms of those loan agreements brought forth resentment, national humiliation and deep-seated historic anger.
Böhmermann's satires reframed and turned a serious and frightening matter on its head. Techniques like role reversal were used to turn things upside down, to invite laughter about very serious and weighty matters, namely debt defaults, and the attitudes of earnestness and self-regarding media pundits and other deadly serious political experts.
Böhmermann's satirical work itself was an ethical response to what Critchley (2007) refers to as situated injustice. It was political in the ways it enlivened and expanded public debate about German-Greek relations in the context of the euro crisis. It demonstrates also how the arts, and satire in particular, influence the ways people see the world, an insight that is largely missing from conventional understandings of the political as described above. Such overly narrow conceptualizations fail to recognize ethico-political engagements, the role of emotions play of the kind represented in this case study. As Manning argues, such 'narrow hegemonic definitions of politics are outdated and do not help in understanding contemporary conditions and the prevailing rich political repertoire (Manning, 2012, pp. 1-17) .
These satires provide brief moments of disruption; they put normality on to hold, and open space for dissent, and invert conventional ways of seeing. Normal protocols were suspended to give way to creative energies. The user-generated satires created short-lived moments when the less powerful, in this case Böhmermann, as a young satirist exercised his power.
'The powerful' and 'respected' became objects of mockery, the wise and expert became fools, and serious weighty matters became the subject of light, playful subversiveness. Soon after normality returned, traditional power relations were re-inscribed and order was restored. They served as a reminder that things can change, that the prevailing institutional arrangements, the norms that governed our lives and categories through which we see are historically specific, made up and can therefore change.
Conclusion
In this article, I identified how political science understands satire and humour. I highlighted a problem evident in the dominant definition of politics in mainstream political science which is overly narrow. It is privileging of rationality that encourages a blindness to the important role of moral emotions, ethics, and various forms of play, ridicule and dissent. Privileging rationality also means ignoring the idea of politics as 'agonistic', thereby creating a blindness to politics that comes in the form of 'conflict-decision', and a blindness to seeing the constitutive role of opposition (Mouffe, 2005a, p. 3).
A case study was used to underscore the political nature of satire, and how it challenges conventional conceptions of deliberative practice as rational and oriented to consensus. It was argued that these expressive art forms shape perceptions and ethical frames. It is action that evokes powerful moral emotions and informs the political will of the citizenry and the public sphere as much as activities deemed to be rational. Moreover, user-generated satire facilitated through digital media enables direct bottom-up action in ways that enrich democratic practice and augment the public sphere.
It was also argued that, courtesy of digital media, we are witnessing a flourishing of this kind of political action. User-generated satire is a popular form of youthful political engagement that is often overlooked in the youth politics and youth studies literature (Jonnum, 2013) . This article used a case study to highlight the way the expressive arts and digital media can be used to reframe of the politics of austerity in ways that are contra to how those politics are conventionally represented.
User-generated satire like that identified in this article has flourished with the advent of new media, as more users take advantage of digital technology and make their own content, then broadcast it globally in ways that enrich the public sphere. As Dias da Silva and Luís Garcia argue, its development has come to play a significant role in politics of late (2012, pp. 89-114) . User-generated and digitally mediated critiques in the form of remixes, mash-ups, spoof and satires now populate the public sphere. They have also reshaped mainstream media in ways that see these user-generated satires created by and large by young people break out from YouTube and other file-sharing sites into mainstream media.
